

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

13 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hal Ford

RE: Notes for Responses to Congressional Interrogatories

I. Significant Intelligence Failures (Since 14 October 1980)

1. SRP knows of no significant estimative intelligence failures since the Act's enactment, with the possible exception of the Falklands episode, on which we understand a DDI post-mortem has already been made available to the appropriate Congressional committees.

2. Poland may be a possible addition but seems to us a moot case. Perhaps the most that can be said is that there was an underestimation of the regime's capacity to use Polish forces against the Polish people and of the latter's acquiescence in that use to forestall the worse alternative of Soviet invasion and occupation.

II. Congressional Reporting Requirement

3. It had been our understanding that, whatever language in the Act bears on the point (Sec. 501 (a)?) was directed to illegal intelligence activity or significant operational failures. This is no doubt something for the lawyers to construe in the light of legislative history, etc. But it does not strike us as a point which should be lightly conceded.

III. Procedures to Identify Significant Failures

4. We believe the organization and operations of the SRP are a matter of repeated record and Congressional report. We would suppose that, in discussing instruments and procedures, there might also be merit in reviewing again for the Committees the roles and functions of the Warning Community and the Watch Committee.

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5. On the SRP, if it would be helpful, perhaps something in whole or in part along these lines could be used:

"The Senior Review Panel is an independent, collegial body attached to the Office of the DCI. It conducts substantive reviews of the major products of the Intelligence Community, at all appropriate stages in their preparation, with a view to improving their quality and usefulness to US Government policymakers. It also carries out post-audits of finished intelligence and production processes on its own initiative or at the request of the DCI or DDCI; undertakes such special studies or reviews as they may direct; and provides them with such recommendations as the Panel deems appropriate, from time to time, for the improvement of the overall intelligence process.

"Its members have generally been retired senior officers from the Executive Branch, business, academics, and science with direct national-level policy-making experience. Present members are [redacted] Ambassador William Leonhart, [redacted]

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"Some of the Panel's major studies and performance recommendations are:

Examination of the Intelligence Community Performance Regarding the Soviet Military Presence in Cuba; June 1980

Phase I, Senior Review Panel Survey and Evaluation of NFAC Production, 1 April 1979-31 March 1980; August 1980

Phase II, Senior Review Panel Survey and Evaluation of NFAC Production, 1 April 1979-31 March 1980; March 1981

Report on the Performance of the Intelligence Community with Respect to the Soviet ALFA-Class Submarine; November 1981

Report on Intelligence Performance on Soviet Oil Production; April 1982

Report on a Study of Intelligence Judgments
Preceding Significant Historical
Failures: The Hazards of Single-Outcome
Forecasting; 16 December 1983"

(Special Note: The Panel regards the
foregoing--as all its other products--as
DCI papers, to be identified or dis-
seminated only with the express
authorization of the DCI.)



William Leonhart

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ODCI/SRP:tb
Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - SRP File (Congressional)
1 - SRP Chrono
1 - Ea SRP Member

SAP/Beel L.

One of the many batches
of questions from the
SSI. I'm on the look
for this one, & will call
you for some ideas. TKS -
Date 1/22

ok

A&P Questions for the Record/General

(Similar to
SCI Overview
Question)

Intelligence Failure

The Intelligence Oversight Act requires that any significant intelligence failure, including errors in analysis and/or prediction, be reported on a timely basis to the Congressional Intelligence Committees. Such report must also include a statement of any corrective action that has been taken or is planned. The testimony of Ambassador Cohen (INR) and Mr. Nagy (DIA) that the non-prediction of Argentina's invasion of the Falklands constituted an intelligence failure appears to be the first, albeit apparently untimely, official notification of such a failure pursuant to the Act.

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A. Does CIA agree with the view of INR and DIA expressed by Ambassador Cohen and Mr. Nagy? If not, please explain.

IPC B. Have the heads of various entities of the Intelligence Community identified any other significant failures in analysis or prediction since enactment of the Act (October 14, 1980)? The head of each entity of the Intelligence Community is requested to provide a summary of each significant failure in analysis or prediction, whether and when each such failure was reported to the Committee and the nature of the corrective action taken in each case.

Refer to
Latham to

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IPC

C. What procedures do the various entities of the Intelligence Community have to identify significant failures in analysis or prediction and to assure that they are reported on a timely basis to the Committee. Does the DCI have a procedure to identify significant failures in analysis or prediction in NIEs and other national products and to assure they are reported on a timely basis to the Committee? Please provide copies of these procedures.